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The
Outcome of Dickerson v. United States
The
Majority Opinion
In the 7 to 2
decision, the Supreme Court of the United States found that
the appeals court was wrong. Chief Justice William Rehnquist
wrote the majority opinion in which the Court upheld or
affirmed Miranda, saying that it was a "Constitutional
decision" of the Supreme Court and such decisions can
not be overturned by a law passed by Congress. Rehnquist
concedes that the Miranda warnings are not required
by the constitution, saying "The dissent argues that
it is judicial overreaching for this Court to hold §3501
unconstitutional unless we hold that the Miranda
warnings are required by the Constitution. . . . But we
need not go farther than Miranda to decide this case.
Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning
and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in
the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh
heavily against overruling it now. . . . We do not think
there is such justification for overruling Miranda.
Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice
to the point where the warnings have become part of our
national culture."
The
Dissenting Opinion
In
his dissent, Justice Scalia, who is joined by Justice Thomas,
is critical of the reasoning used by Rehnquist. He says:
"Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),
held that an Act of Congress will not be enforced by the
courts if what it prescribes violates the Constitution of
the United States. That was the basis on which Miranda
was decided. One will search today's opinion in vain, however,
for a statement (surely simple enough to make) that what
18 U. S. C. §3501 prescribes-the use at trial of a
voluntary confession, even when a Miranda warning
or its equivalent has failed to be given-violates the Constitution.
The reason the statement does not appear is not only (and
perhaps not so much) that it would be absurd, inasmuch as
§3501 excludes from trial precisely what the Constitution
excludes from trial, viz., compelled confessions; but also
that Justices whose votes are needed to compose today's
majority are on record as believing that a violation of
Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution….
And so, to justify today's agreed-upon result, the Court
must adopt a significant new, if not entirely comprehensible,
principle of constitutional law. As the Court chooses to
describe that principle, statutes of Congress can be disregarded,
not only when what they prescribe violates the Constitution,
but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision of this
Court that "announced a constitutional rule,"
ante, at 7. As I shall discuss in some detail, the
only thing that can possibly mean in the context of this
case is that this Court has the power, not merely to apply
the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards
as useful "prophylactic" restrictions upon Congress
and the States. That is an immense and frightening antidemocratic
power, and it does not exist.
It
takes only a small step to bring today's opinion out of
the realm of power-judging and into the mainstream of legal
reasoning: The Court need only go beyond its carefully couched
iterations that "Miranda is a constitutional
decision," ante, at 8, that "Miranda
is constitutionally based," ante, at 10, that
Miranda has "constitutional underpinnings,"
ante, at 10, n. 5, and come out and say quite clearly:
"We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that
is not preceded by Miranda warnings or their equivalent
violates the Constitution of the United States." It
cannot say that, because a majority of the Court does not
believe it. The Court therefore acts in plain violation
of the Constitution when it denies effect to this Act of
Congress."
Questions to consider:
- According
to the Supreme Court of the United States, is the Miranda
warning required by the United States constitution?
- What
justification does the Court provide for affirming Miranda?
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Justice Scalia says, "And so, to justify today's
agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significant
new, if not entirely comprehensible, principle
of constitutional law." What does he mean by this?
What is the "new . . . principle of constitutional
law"?
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What are Scalia's concerns regarding the future of the
Court?
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