MIRANDA
v. ARIZONA: A PRIMER
Constitutional Foundations of Miranda
The
Miranda case dealt with the admissibility of
statements made during "custodial interrogation"
under the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Under Miranda,
prior to interrogation, a person in custody must be told
of the right to remain silent and the likelihood that
statements made by the person will be used against him
or her in court. Recognizing that the average citizen
might not understand which statements are incriminating
or how they might be used in court, the Supreme Court
requires persons in custody to be told of their right
to an attorney. The Court saw an obvious connection between
the two amendments—statements made without counsel
tended to self-incriminate (protected by the Fifth Amendment)
and the right to counsel (protected by the Sixth Amendment)
was not particularly helpful once the incriminating statements
had been made.
When the Miranda rules are not followed, statements
are excluded for three reasons: (1) to avoid the risk
that statements were compelled in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights; (2) to encourage officers to comply
with the Miranda rules, thereby lessening the
future likelihood of compelled self-incrimination; and
(3) to discourage the kinds of unsavory police practices
that tended to "compel" confessions from suspects.
The Constitution does not explicitly require such warnings
or the exclusion of statements given in the absence of
such warnings. However, a majority of the Court viewed
custodial interrogations as inherently coercive and feared
that the absence of a warning requirement and exclusionary
rule (the rule that excludes the evidence from being used
at trial under most circumstances) would render the Fifth
Amendment meaningless. Textualists, those advocating a
strictly text-based interpretation of the Constitution,
criticize this methodology as judicial "creation" of rights.
Analytical
Approaches to Miranda: Is Miranda Applicable?
Miranda
does not apply unless a person is in custody and subjected
to official interrogation.
| 1.
Was the suspect in custody? |
| |
Definitions |
| |
|
- Custody
requires a "significant deprivation of liberty."
|
| |
|
- A
person is in custody only if he or she is subjected
to either formal arrest or its functional equivalent.
|
| |
|
|
- Formal
arrest – occurs when a person is explicitly
told he or she is being placed under arrest.
|
| |
|
|
- Functional
equivalent – occurs when a suspect's freedom
of action is significantly curtailed to a degree
associated with a formal arrest.
|
| |
Objective
vs. Subjective Analysis |
| |
|
- The
custody issue is most difficult when evaluating
functional equivalents of arrests. From whose
perspective do we evaluate whether the suspect's
freedom of action is significantly curtailed?
There are three possible approaches:
|
| |
|
|
- The
particular suspect involved (subjective analysis)
|
| |
|
|
|
- Did
this particular suspect actually believe that
he or she was not free to leave?
|
| |
|
|
|
- This
approach is most favorable to suspects, but
suspects will always argue that they believed
they were not free to leave.
|
| |
|
|
- That
particular officer(s) involved (subjective analysis)
–
|
| |
|
|
|
- Did
the actual officer(s) involved intend to restrict
the suspect's freedom of movement?
|
| |
|
|
|
- This
approach is most deferential to the officers,
who will always argue that they did not intend
to restrict the suspect's freedom of movement.
|
| |
|
|
- A
reasonable person under the same conditions
of the suspect (objective analysis) –
|
| |
|
|
|
- Would
a reasonable person under the same circumstances
believe he or she was free to leave? (In other
words: what would an average or typical member
of the community think under the same circumstances?
– the idea being that it gets the court
out of the business of trying to figure out
what this particular person thought.)
|
| |
|
|
|
- This
approach creates a body of law that allows some
predictability to determine whether custody
was established in the situation.
|
| |
|
- The
Court has chosen to use this third approach
– the objective analysis.
|
| 2.
Did a known government agent1 interrogate
the suspect? |
| |
Definitions: |
| |
|
- "Interrogation"
includes any direct questioning by officers
about a crime under investigation and more subtle
forms of questioning that are the "functional
equivalent" of direct questioning.
|
| |
|
- The
"functional equivalent" of direct questioning
is any speech or actions by an officer that
she should have known were reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response.
|
| |
|
|
- Determining
the "functional equivalent"
|
| |
|
|
|
- In
determining whether an officer's words or actions
constituted the "functional equivalent"
of direct questioning, several principles should
be considered:
|
| |
|
|
|
|
- Reasonably
likely: Courts will deem it "interrogation"
only if officers knew (subjective analysis)
or should have known (objective analysis) and
incriminating response was reasonably likely.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
- NOTE:
What the officer should have known is judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer
in the same situation.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
- Officer's
intent: Courts will probably consider
it to be "interrogation" if the officer
actually intended that his words or conduct
would elicit an incriminating response.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
- Officer's
knowledge of the suspect: Courts will
usually treat it as "Interrogation"
if an officer was aware of – and exploited
–: a suspect's unusual weakness or fear.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
- Link
between the question and crime: Courts
will be more apt to deem a question "interrogation"
if there was direct link between the question
and the crime under investigation.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
- Accusations:
Accusing a suspect of committing a crime is
virtually always "interrogation" because
an incriminating response is reasonably foreseeable.
|
| |
|
- NOTE
that subtle actions by the officer, statements
to suspects, and conversations in the presence
of suspects which were meant to elicit a particular
response, may be deemed interrogation. However,
spontaneous statements volunteered by the suspect
are NOT considered the product of interrogation
even if the suspect was in custody at the time.
|
___________________________
1
Even if the person is in custody, Miranda only
applies if the suspect was interrogated by known government
agents.
Step
#1 - Was the person "in custody"?
- Was there a formal arrest?
- If yes — Step #2
- If no — Analyze functional equivalent at
Step #1(b)
- If there was no formal arrent, would a reasonable suspect in the same situation have believed he or she was not free to leave?
- If yes — Step #2
- If no — No custody; Miranda does
not apply
Step #2 - If the person was in custody,
was the person "interrogated" by an official?
- Given the officer's knowledge of the suspect, did
the officer know his or her questions or statements
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response?
- If yes — Miranda applies
- If no — Analyze whether the officer should
have known at Step #2(b)
- Would a "resonable officer" under the same circumstance
and with the same knowledge of the suspect have known
that an incriminating response was reasonably likely?
- If yes — Miranda applies
- If no — Miranda does not apply
**NOTE: The words "reasonable" and "reasonably" indicate
that an objective standard is being used.**
|